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When a litigant loses a well-publicized case in the trial court, the
response to a reporter's question is: "We will appeal to the su-
preme court." The appeal, however, will in all likelihood be to an
intermediate appellate court panel of three judges, whose identity
will not be known until just before the case is heard. It is the per-
ception of the public, and even some members of the legal profes-
sion, that they are entitled to have their appeals reviewed by the
court of last resort in their state. Regrettably, there is no realistic
understanding of the numerical impossibility of every case being
reviewed by that court.
There has been an appellate caseload explosion in this country
commencing in the early sixties. In the decade from 1973 to 1982
the number of appeals increased by 101% in forty-three states.'
Five of the most populous states have intermediate appellate court
caseloads exceeding eight thousand cases annually, and two of
those have caseloads in excess of thirteen thousand.'
In the past twenty years, twenty-two states have established in-
termediate appellate courts, and, at present, thirty-six states have
intermediate appellate courts.8 Litigants in many instances do not
perceive a three-judge panel of an intermediate appellate court as
a place of finality, and it appears that the creation of such a court
* Justice, Supreme Court of Florida, 1974 to present, Chief Justice 1976-1978. B.S. 1949,
J.D. 1952, University of Florida. This article was submitted as the author's thesis for an
LL.M. degree in Judicial Process received in 1984 from the University of Virginia.
1. National Center for State Courts, State Appellate Caseload Growth 2 (Oct. 1983)
(draft report prepared by the Project To Document, Analyze, and Forecast Appellate
Caseload Trends) [hereinafter cited as National Center].
2. A questionnaire was sent to the chief justices of the ten most populous states (Califor-
nia, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, & North
Carolina) in August of 1983. A compilation of the statistical information is contained in
Appendix A (for courts of last resort) and Appendix B (for intermediate appellate courts).
3. National Center, supra note 1, at 2.
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initially increases appellate caseloads." These courts are, however,
necessary to respond to the increasing demands on the system.
As these intermediate appellate courts add judges to meet ex-
panding caseloads, the resulting increased number of three-judge
panels cannot help but increase the number of inconsistent and
conflicting decisions. When there is a general rotation among the
total court, the multiple combinations of judges that will comprise
each three-judge panel compounds the problem. With a twelve-
member court, the number of possible different panel combina-
tions is 220, with fifteen the number is 455, with twenty the num-
ber is 1,140, and with twenty-three the number is 1,771. Further, it
is not unusual for these appellate courts to decline to write defini-
tive opinions with reasons, either because they do not have the
time or because the issues are not perceived to be of significant
precedential value.5 Memorandum opinions or summary decisions
are now used in over seventy-five percent of intermediate appellate
court decisions.' The public and the legal profession criticize the
large two-tier appellate structures for creating courts that speak
"through multiple voices '" and that produce decisions that are
without reason or explanation. They complain that these interme-
diate appellate courts are used as a means to deny access to the
court of last .resort and only increase the cost of appellate litiga-
tion.' These criticisms reflect some justifiable concerns about how
the two-tier appellate structure has responded to large caseloads,
and they have necessarily affected the credibility of the involved
appellate courts.
This article will address the problems created by appellate
caseload growth and will suggest some new administrative tech-
niques designed to address these problems in a manner that will
increase the uniformity of appellate decisions, provide a forum,
4. Id. at 17.
5. See generally P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31-35
(1976) [hereinafter cited as P. CARRINGTON]; R. MAcCRATE, J. HOPKINS & M. ROSENBERG,
APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEw YORK 90 (1982) [hereinafter cited as R. MAcCRATE]; R. STERN,
APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.6 (1981); B. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE
COURT OPINIONS (1977); 1977 Appellate Judges Seminar, Court Management by Appellate
Courts.
6. See Appendix B.
7. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Or-
ganization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471, 474 (1983).
8. From testimony heard at public hearings conducted by the Florida Supreme Court's
Article V Review Commission in August and September 1983. Transcripts are available at
the Florida Supreme Court Library and summarized in THE SUPREME COURT'S ARTICLE V
REviEw COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 15 (1984).
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other than the court of last resort, to address issues of significant
precedential value, and provide a means to aid courts of last resort
in obtaining important issues for resolution. The following are
three appellate administrative procedures which should be imple-
mented in a two-tier appellate structure: (1) en banc proceedings
in intermediate appellate courts to help avoid conflicts and ensure
harmonious decisions within those courts and to provide a forum
to address important issues of first impression; (2) the creation of
semipermanent administrative divisions within intermediate appel-
late courts, with the selective assignment of certain categories of
cases to the divisions under a subject matter assignment plan to
limit the multiplicity of panels that must decide various legal is-
sues; and (3) the use of certified questions propounded by interme-
diate appellate courts to aid a court of last resort in screening cases
to determine the important issues it should resolve. Before discuss-
ing these procedures, it is appropriate to review the specific func-
tions of intermediate and final appellate courts and examine the
present status of the appellate court structure of the ten most pop-
ulous states.
II. PRESENT STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURTS
To determine the present status of the appellate structure of the
ten most populous states, a questionnaire was sent to the chief jus-
tices of the courts of last resort of those states. Their responses are
reflected in the charts of Highest Appellate Courts and Intermedi-
ate Appellate Courts contained in Appendix A and Appendix B,
respectively. The National Center for State Courts has recently
prepared a draft study concerning state appellate caseload growth,
concentrating on growth during the last decade.9 The responses to
the questionnaire and the National Center study show graphically
how appellate structure has grown to meet the challenge of the
caseload explosion. This information will be referred to throughout
this article.
The two primary and distinct functions exercised by appellate
courts are (a) error-correcting and (b) policy- or law-making. 10 The
primary responsibility of an intermediate appellate court is to ex-
ercise the error-correcting function. In this function, the appellate
court reviews the trial court proceedings to determine (1) whether
9. National Center, supra note 1.
10. The functions of appellate courts are more fully expressed in P. CARRINGTON, supra
note 5, at 2-7.
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there was sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, (2) whether
proper trial procedure was used, and (3) whether the settled law
was applied to the facts as reflected in the record.1
The primary responsibility of courts of last resort is to address
questions that concern legal principles of statewide importance.
This task is ordinarily identified as the law- or policy-making func-
tion. In carrying out this function, courts of last resort should be
considering cases to (1) resolve conflicts and thereby maintain doc-
trinal harmony; (2) provide authoritative construction of the state
and United States constitutions; (3) determine the validity of state
statutes; and (4) establish or modify legal principles of statewide
importance." In limited instances, courts of last resort also exer-
cise error-correcting functions in those cases appealed directly to
them, for example, the direct appeal of death penalty cases or the
validity of state statutes.
The public and, to some extent, the bar do not completely un-
derstand these distinctive functions of the intermediate and final
appellate courts. Further, many believe there is a denial of access
when all cases decided by an intermediate appellate court are not
subject to review by the state supreme court. To understand the
operations of the two-tiered appellate process, it is important to
know how these functions are carried out in the thirty-six states
which utilize this process. Also, it is important to recognize that
the larger the overall appellate caseload, the less a court of last
resort exercises any error-correcting function and the more an in-
termediate appellate court must assume some of the policy- and
law-making functions of the court of last resort.
California grants to its supreme court discretionary authority to
review its approximately fourteen thousand intermediate appellate
court decisions,'" and as a result approximately twenty-five percent
of the losing litigants in California courts of appeal exercise that
opportunity to petition their supreme court for review.1' This
broad discretionary review appears, however, to limit the number
of published opinions which that court is able to render on the
merits. 5 Other jurisdictions have placed limitations, other than
11. Id.
12. R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 4-5 (1976).
13. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 10, 12.
14. Of the approximately 4,000 matters filed annually in the California Supreme Court,
over 3,200 are petitions for hearing in cases previously decided by courts of appeal. See
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 93.
15. In 1982 the California Supreme Court published 132 opinions, one of the lowest
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mathematical quotas, on the review of decisions of intermediate
appellate courts with the intent that most of these decisions should
be final. 6 They restrict the review of intermediate appellate court
decisions to certain identified classes of cases. One example is Flor-
ida, in which the intermediate appellate courts, when created in
1957, were intended to be final appellate courts for most cases."
The present constitutional provision limits the Florida Supreme
Court's review primarily to those district court of appeal decisions
in which there is a written opinion that reflects conflict with an-
other district court of appeal or in which the district court of ap-
peal certifies a question for resolution.18 The Supreme Court of
Florida does render a large number of published opinions on the
merits in comparison with other states.1 9
Courts of last resort in this two-tier appellate structure are re-
quired to first perform a screening function in which the court
must decide the issues that are appropriate for review. This is an
important time-consuming responsibility that does not ordinarily
exist for intermediate appellate courts. As the caseload expands,
this screening function of courts of last resort can effectively re-
duce the judicial time available to consider and author opinions in
those cases heard on the merits. There are just so many cases a
court of last resort is able to consider and decide on the merits
with an opinion. The Supreme Court of the United States renders
opinions on the merits in 150 to 175 cases a year.20 Similarly, seven
of the courts of last resort of the ten most populous states render
totals of published opinions for courts of last resort in the most populous states. See Appen-
dix A.
16. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4. The Illinois Supreme Court possesses substantial
discretionary jurisdiction and provides by rule for review of appellate court decisions. Thus,
the court may control its caseload by the appropriate exercise of its rulemaking authority.
17. See generally England, Hunter & Williams, Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 147 (1980); England & Williams,
Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 223 (1981); Overton, Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal: Courts of Final Jurisdiction with Two New Responsibilities, 35 U.
FLA. L. Rav. 80 (1983). According to the SCOND ANNUmAL RmORT OF THE JUDICIML COUNCI.
OF FLORIDA (1955), "[i~n order to avoid any possibility that the creation of these courts
would simply afford an additional appeal, the Council thought that it was wise to have the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court clearly defined and restricted." Id. at 3.
18. See generally Overton, supra note 17, and England, Hunter & Williams, supra note
17.
19. In 1982 the Florida Supreme Court published 342 opinions on the merits. See Ap-
pendix A.
20. RX for an overburdened Supreme Court: is relief in sight?, 66 JUDICATURE 394, 396,
400-05 (1983).
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opinions on the merits in 250 cases or less. 1 Three of the ten states
render opinions in 340 to 400 cases.22
In some instances, courts of last resort have no real control over
the issues they will decide. 23 Most courts have some form of
mandatory jurisdiction, such as where a statute is declared uncon-
stitutional or the death sentence has been imposed.2' One of the
more interesting systems of mandatory jurisdiction is that of the
Court of Appeals of New York, where a single judge has the au-
thority to accept a case for review which that court must then con-
sider on the merits.2 5 The American Bar Association (ABA) stan-
dards and other commentators agree that courts of last resort
should have almost total control over the issues they will decide in
order to assure proper utilization of the limited time available on
that court's calendar.26
All of the ten most populous states have intermediate appellate
courts. In seven of these states the courts serve specific geographic
areas. In the other three states the courts are unitary and serve the
entire state.2 7 The number of geographic districts varies substan-
tially. For instance, Texas has fourteen, Ohio twelve, California
seven, Florida five, and New York four.28 Pennsylvania has a modi-
fied unitary system consisting of two intermediate appellate courts
of statewide jurisdiction, each having distinctive subject matter
jurisdiction.2 '
The reasons for the particular caseload levels for the ten most
populous states are not easily determined. For instance, California
and Florida have intermediate appellate court caseloads of 14,699
and 13,924, respectively, while New York and Texas have substan-
tially lower caseloads of 8,630 and 7,440, respectively. 0 In the past
21. See Appendix A.
22. Id.
23. For example, the New York Court of Appeals has no control over approximately
75% of its calendar. Most of these appeals as of right are in civil cases. Appeals as of right
are regulated by the state constitution and thus cannot be regulated by court rule. See N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 3(b); R. MACCRATE, supra note 5, at 69-86.
24. See Appendix A.
25. The chief judge of the court of appeals must designate a single judge to determine an
application for leave to appeal in a criminal case. The judge may, in his discretion, either
grant or deny such application. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 460.20 (McKinney 1983).
26. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 5, at 150-51; ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JU-
DICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10(c) (Approved
Draft 1977).





ten years intermediate appellate court caseloads have increased by
approximately nine percent per year, and each new trial judge
adds to that percentage growth rate by approximately eleven cases
per judge per year.31 There is, however, some indication that this
annual growth rate is now declining.
82
There is also a substantial variance in the assigned caseload re-
sponsibility for judges of intermediate appellate courts. It varies
from 94 cases per judge in Texas to 384 in Michigan. 8 A majority
of the ten most populous states have a caseload per judge of less
than 200.34 It has been recommended that there be no more than
100 cases assigned per judge for which he has primary responsibil-
ity." There have, however, also been suggestions that the recom-
mended level be as high as 250 cases per judge.
All the intermediate appellate courts render published opinions
in only a limited percentage of the cases they consider on the mer-
its. For example, out of a caseload of more than fourteen thousand
cases, the California courts of appeal published only 1,146 opin-
ions. 7 Florida's intermediate appellate courts, which publish more
opinions than any other state, 4,287, still render written opinions
in less than one-third of the cases heard on the merits." With the
exception of Florida, all of the intermediate appellate courts of the
ten most populous states utilize the nonpublished memorandum
opinion process.39 All use either a memorandum opinion or a sum-
mary affirmance process.4 0 The use of a summary memorandum
opinion or the per-curiam-affirmed opinion is considered necessary
to cope with the burgeoning workload and avoid a flooding of the
reporter system with opinions which have no jurisprudential
value.41 However, the failure of all litigants to receive written opin-
31. National Center, supra note 1, at 5, 20.
32. Id. at 7.
33. See Appendix B.
34. Id.
35. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 5, at 230.
36. See Report of the Supreme Court Commission on the Florida Appellate Court
Structure, 53 FLA. B.J. 274, 276-77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Report]. See also In re Flor-
ida Rules of Judicial Administration (Determination of Need for Additional Judges), 446 So.
2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1984); In re Certificate of Judicial Manpower for District Courts of Appeal,
Circuit Courts & County Courts, as Required by Article V, Section 9, Florida Constitution,
446 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1984).




41. See, e.g., Whipple v. State, 431 So. 2d 1011, 1012-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (court ex-
plained in detail why intermediate courts were unable to write full opinions in each case
1984]
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ions with explanatory reasons for the decision has raised serious
credibility problems for the intermediate appellate courts.42
The caseload of courts of last resort is relatively uniform among
the ten most populous states. With the exception of California
(4,056), New York (3,296), and North Carolina (1,238), the remain-
ing states had caseloads ranging from about 1,500 to 2,100 in
1982. 43 There appears to be no direct correlation between the total
caseload and the number of opinions published. For example, Cali-
fornia, which has the largest caseload, came close to publishing the
least number of opinions (132). 44 On the other hand, Florida,
which had a caseload of 1,465, published 342 opinions.45 A majority
of the states publish less than 240 opinions per year.46
III. THREE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR APPELLATE
COURTS
The expanding appellate caseloads and resulting additional judi-
ciary needed to cope with these caseloads require both the courts
of last resort and the intermediate appellate courts to collectively
seek a means to assure consistent, expeditious decisions that the
public will accept as credible and final. The administrative tech-
niques and procedures discussed below are suggested as means to
provide more effective appellate structure under the strains of an
ever-increasing appellate caseload.
A. En Banc Proceedings in Intermediate Appellate Courts
Although it presently has limited use in state appellate struc-
tures, the en banc process can be a viable means to address the
problem of intermediate appellate courts speaking with multiple
voices. The authorization of an intermediate appellate court to sit
en banc allows that court to act as a whole to assure uniformity of
its decisions and thereby eliminate the responsibility to resolve
those conflicts that now rests in courts of last resort. In addition to
decided on the merits; requiring full opinions in every case, the court concluded, would
greatly delay justice and, in certain cases, would make no contribution to the body of case
law).
42. Id. at 1015. See also P. CARRINGTON, supra note 5, at 31-42; Anstead, Selective Pub-
lication: An Alternative to the PCA?, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 189, 203-04 (1982).




47. Meador, supra note 7, at 474.
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resolving conflicts among panels of the same court, this process
also provides the intermediate appellate court with a means to
speak with a strong voice on issues of importance within that
court's jurisdiction. There can be an incidental benefit in that the
process can provide a forum for relief to the litigant who believes
he has an important issue for resolution but finds, for all practical
purposes, the door to the court of last resort closed.
Of the ten most populous states, only Texas, Pennsylvania, and
Florida utilize an en banc process in their intermediate appellate
courts. Michigan has the en banc authority but its court of appeals
does not utilize the process. The remaining states, California, New
York, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and North Carolina, do not allow
their intermediate courts to sit en banc and leave to their courts of
last resort the sole responsibility of resolving conflicts that arise
among the intermediate court panels.48
The federal circuit courts of appeals now have a fully developed
en banc process49 which to a limited extent has been used as a
model for state intermediate appellate courts. The en banc process
in the federal system was first initiated in the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals as a needed judicial administrative tool without any ex-
press statutory or rule authority.50 Their action was approved by
the United States Supreme Court in its decision in Textile Mills
Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,1 in which the Supreme Court
upheld the inherent authority of the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to establish a procedure for that court to sit en banc. In con-
struing the statutory provision establishing the circuit courts of ap-
peals, it concluded that the proviso that there should be a circuit
court of appeals in each circuit "which shall consist of three
judges" did not prohibit an en banc process and that the quoted
phrase did not restrict the court to deciding cases only with three
judges.5 2 It expressly approved the en banc process as a means of
"more effective judicial administration" and determined that
"[clonflicts within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decision in
48. See Appendix B.
49. See infra notes 55-57.
50. The Third Circuit established the right of the court to sit en banc by promulgating
Rules 4 and 5, which were effective March 1, 1940. The Third Circuit upheld the validity of
the rules and detailed the history of en banc proceedings in Commissioner v. Textile Mills
Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940). Thirteen years later the Third Circuit published a
statement which outlined the procedure and explained its operation. Hearing & Rehearing
Cases In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91 (3d Cir. 1953).
51. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
52. Id. at 332-33.
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the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted."53 In a subsequent
case, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that view and
held that the en banc process was an expression of the court's
power rather than a party's statutory right.5 While holding that a
litigant does not have a right to an en banc hearing, the Supreme
Court did find that a circuit court of appeals must consider a liti-
gant's request for such a hearing.
The en banc process in the federal circuits is now controlled by
both federal statutes5 5 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
35,6 in addition to the adoption of local rules not in conflict with
those provisions.5 7 The process is also controlled by case law which
53. Id. at 335.
54. Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953). The court of appeals,
in denying an application for rehearing en banc, held that the responsibility for determina-
tion of the en banc request rested with the division of the court that had heard the appeal
on the merits. The United States Supreme Court found that the determination of an en
banc question was a matter within the discretion of the court and either the division or the
full court could make the determination. Id. at 267.
55. Federal statutory authority for en banc hearings is found in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982),
which provides:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of
not more than three judges (except that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit may sit in panels of more than three judges if its rules so
provide), unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service. A
court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service, or such
number of judges as may be prescribed in accordance with section 6 of Public Law
95-486 (92 Stat. 1633), except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be
eligible to participate, at his election and upon designation and assignment pursu-
ant to section 294(c) of this title and the rules of the circuit, as a member of an in
banc court reviewing a decision of a panel of which such judge was a member.
56. FED. R. App. P. 35(a) provides for the determination of when a court will order an en
banc proceeding:
When hearing or rehearing in banc will be ordered.-A majority of the circuit
judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other pro-
ceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals in banc. Such a hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consid-
eration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its deci-
sions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
Rule 35(b) also provides authority for the litigants to suggest to the court that an en banc
proceeding is appropriate in a given case:
Suggestion of a party for hearing or rehearing in banc.-A party may suggest
the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in banc. No response shall be filed
unless the court shall so order. The clerk shall transmit any such suggestion to the
members of the panel and the judges of the court who are in regular active service
but a vote need not be taken to determine whether the cause shall be heard or
reheard in banc unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who was a mem-
ber of the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on
such a suggestion made by a party.
57. While some circuits have not promulgated specific en banc rules, and instead rely
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prevents one panel from overruling another panel's prior decision
on the same point of law. 8 It appears that at least seven circuits
have expressly adopted the view that only the court of appeals en
banc, and not a panel, may overrule another panel's decision in a
prior case.59 The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
would like to carry that rule a step further and has advocated that
a three-judge panel of one circuit should be prohibited from reach-
ing a result contrary to that reached on the same point of law by a
three-judge panel of another circuit. To reach a contrary result, the
Chief Justice would require a circuit court to hold an en banc hear-
upon FED. R. App. P. 35, others have consistent local rules regulating en banc proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has 9TH CIR. R. 12, providing for the suggestion of appro-
priateness of rehearing en banc, which reads as follows:
Rule 12. Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehearing En Banc.
Where a suggestion of the appropriateness of a rehearing en banc, made pursu-
ant to Rule 35(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is made as part of a
petition for rehearing, a reference to such suggestion, as well as to the petition for
rehearing, shall appear on the cover of the combined petition and suggestion; and
unless this is done the Court shall not be required to consider such suggestion.
The Ninth Circuit also has a local court rule which delineates the composition of the en
banc court. Rule 25 provides:
Rule 25. Limited En Banc Court.
The en banc court, for each case or related group of cases taken en banc, shall
consist of the chief judge of the circuit or the next senior active judge in the ab-
sence of the chief judge and ten additional judges to be drawn by lot from the
active judges of the Court.
The drawing of the en banc court will be performed by the Clerk or a deputy
clerk of the Court in the presence of at least one active judge and shall take place
on the first working day following the date of the order taking the case or group of
related cases en banc.
If a judge whose name is drawn for a particular en banc court is disqualified,
recused, or knows that he or she will be unable to sit at the time and place desig-
nated for the en banc case or cases, the judge will immediately notify the chief
judge who will direct the Clerk to draw a replacement judge by lot.
Notwithstanding the provision herein for random drawing of names by lot, if a
judge is not drawn on any of three successive en banc courts, that judge's name
shall automatically be placed on the next en banc court.
In appropriate cases, the Court may order a rehearing by the full court following
a hearing or rehearing en banc.
58. See, e.g., Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981); Ingram v.
Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Timmreck v.
United States, 577 F.2d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 780
(1979); Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Lewis, 475 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Reed v.
Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 740 (3d Cir. 1972); Charleston v. United States, 444 F.2d 504, 506
(9th Cir. 1971). See also Annot., 37 A.L.R. FED. 274, 293 (1978).
59. Annot., 37 A.L.R. FED. 274, 293-94. The following circuits permit panel decisions to
be overruled only by en banc decisions: Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh.
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ing. 0 The purpose of the Chief Justice's proposal is not only to
avoid conflict among panels within the same circuit but also con-
flicts between panels of different circuits.
The Florida Supreme Court, following the lead of the United
States Supreme Court, construed the Florida constitutional provi-
sion establishing its district courts of appeal and held that the lan-
guage "three judges shall consider each cause" is not a limitation
on those courts sitting en banc. The court, exercising its constitu-
tionally established rulemaking authority, proceeded to authorize
its intermediate district courts of appeal to sit en banc, although it
limited their authority to the resolution of intradistrict conflicts.6
The en banc process in the state appellate structure, as previ-
ously stated in this article, is not presently used extensively, but as
the appellate caseload grows, and the number of judges on inter-
mediate appellate courts increases, the opportunity for panel con-
flict increases substantially. This process provides a more accessi-
ble forum to resolve these conflicts because there are only so many
cases that can be accepted by courts of last resort. Clearly, an al-
ternative judicial administrative means to resolve some of these
conflicting decisions is necessary.
Although the en banc procedure is a judicial administrative. tool
to maintain doctrinal harmony, there is no question that it-adds
judicial labor and may create the administrative problem of how a
court can effectively sit en banc when it consists of more than
twelve judges. Probably the most significant disadvantage to the en
banc process is the amount of judicial labor required. Even to con-
sider the initial request for a hearing takes a considerable amount
of judicial time because of the number of judges who must vote on
the petition. When a three-judge panel renders a decision and a
petition for rehearing en banc is filed, all judges will ordinarily,
and may be mandated to, consider the petition for the en banc
hearing in a proceeding in which only three are familiar with the
record in the case. It can also be difficult for a large court to expe-
ditiously respond to an en banc petition. Presently, the federal
process provides for all judges of the circuit courts of appeals to
receive a copy of a petition for rehearing en banc.
There are some administrative solutions that can reduce to some
60. Remarks by Chief Justice Warren Burger, American Judicature Society (Jan. 1983).
61. See In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En
Banc, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1982); In re Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 374 So. 2d 992 (Fla.), modified, 377 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1979). See also
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.331.
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degree the amount of judicial labor expended in the en banc pro-
cess. Florida, in adopting its en banc rule, expressly eliminated the
requirement that judges other than panel members must review
petitions for en banc consideration. Under the Florida procedure,
nonpanel members are not mandated to consider an en banc re-
hearing petition. If one active judge on the court asks for a vote on
the petition, however, then all active judges must vote on the re-
quest. Therefore, any active judge may initiate a vote of the entire
court on the petition. While not necessarily mandating that all
judges participate in each decision on an en banc petition, this pro-
cedure allows active judges not on the panel to take an interest in
questions they believe are important for resolution by the court as
a whole.2
The en banc authority also creates an administrative manage-
ment problem when large intermediate appellate courts consisting
of more than twelve judges are required to sit en banc to consider
matters on the merits. The judicial man-hours necessary to become
prepared to participate in a merit consideration of a case in these
circumstances are substantial. The large number of judicial man-
hours consumed may not be fully warranted or necessary to main-
tain harmonious decisions within the court.
One solution to that problem has been the utilization of a special
en banc panel composed of less than the entire intermediate appel-
late court. In this process, the special en banc panel's decision
binds the entire court the same as a full en banc decision. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, now composed of twenty-three
judges, has a local rule which allows it to sit en banc in an eleven-
member panel consisting of the chief judge and ten active judges
who are drawn by lot.6 3 In this circumstance a manageable eleven-
member court is provided to resolve conflicts within the circuit.
Another reduced en banc panel procedure exists in the Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court, which consists of sixteen judges. It is author-
ized to sit en banc with an en banc panel of seven judges selected
by the chief judge." Some authorities believe that when a court
becomes large in number the en banc procedure becomes not only
ineffective, because it is wasteful in terms of judicial manpower,
but that it also becomes counterproductive. 6" The upper limit of
62. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.331. For a full discussion of the procedural operation of the
Florida en banc rule, see Overton, supra note 17, at 89-93.
63. See supra note 57.
64. See PA. R. App. P. 3103(a).
65. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 5, at 156-63.
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effectiveness appears to be twelve judges.
The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court opposes
the use of reduced en banc panels of less than the total number of
judges on the court and advocates that when a circuit court of ap-
peals becomes too large to efficiently sit en bane, the court should
be split into two circuits so that it can operate with a manageable
en banc process." With regard to the Pennsylvania procedure,
most experienced appellate judges and lawyers would recognize
that this reduced en bane panel has the distinct disadvantage of
providing the chief judge with the opportunity to singly determine
the result of the en bane proceeding by selectively choosing who
will sit on the panel.
It must be recognized that intermediate appellate courts are not
established just to meet the optimum size criteria for an en bane
panel. There are large intermediate appellate courts that serve just
one limited geographic area. For example, the second district in
California, which serves Los Angeles, is presently composed of
twenty-six judges. 7 There are also large unitary courts that serve
an entire state, for example, Michigan's with eighteen judges.
These courts do need a means to resolve their intracourt conflicts,
and the en bane process can provide at least a partial solution to
that problem.
A reduced en bane panel is a viable solution, although it is ex-
tremely important that the procedure for selecting the panel not
only be fair in practice, but also that it be perceived as fair and
authoritative by the judges on the subject court, the legal profes-
sion, and the public. The Ninth Circuit process of selection by lot
appears to provide a reasonable method of selecting a reduced en
bane panel.68 Another alternative would be to divide the active
judges of an intermediate appellate court into three equal catego-
ries consisting of the one-third most junior in time of service, the
one-third most senior in time of service, and the one-third in the
middle with regard to seniority. Assuming the intermediate appel-
late court consists of fifteen active judges, there would be five
judges in each category. A reduced en bane panel could consist of
three judges selected from each category by lot. If it is determined
that the chief judge should always preside in all en bane cases,
then he would take a position within his respective category on the
66. See Remarks by Chief Justice Warren Burger, supra note 60.
67. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 191.
68. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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court.
Another consideration which should be given to any reduced en
banc panel is whether the members of the original panel should
automatically be part of the panel that considers the case en banc.
The Ninth Circuit apparently rejected any special consideration
for the original panel members.
Probably the best solution to the problem of a large intermedi-
ate appellate court is combining a reduced en banc panel proce-
dure with the implementation of subject matter organization and
assignment of judges to administrative divisions.69 Under this
scheme, the administrative divisions established to handle special
assignments under a subject matter organization plan could sit en
banc in their assigned categories of cases. When a broader en banc
hearing is necessary, a reduced en banc panel, consisting of judges
selected by lot from each division, could be established. For in-
stance, if the court has a total of fifteen judges and is organized in
three divisions of five judges each, each division would sit in its
assigned category of cases. If the legal issue had broad implica-
tions, a reduced en banc panel could be selected from the entire
court by having three judges selected from each division to consti-
tute a nine-member en banc panel. One of the major criticisms
concerning a reduced en banc panel is that a decision is made by
less than the entire court.7 0 A proper response to this criticism is
that the number of judges who will actually consider the issue is
probably the same or greater than the number which would hear it
if the matter were heard by the court of last resort. The most im-
portant factor is that the panel must be representative of the court
as a whole and must be able to speak authoritatively to harmonize
the decisions of that court.
Although the en banc process primarily provides a suitable
means to assure uniformity of decisions within a particular court,
it can also provide other benefits to the judicial system. The pro-
cess can be utilized to allow intermediate appellate courts to speak
forcefully on issues of significant precedential value. When an in-
termediate appellate court has the authority to act on issues of ex-
ceptional importance, its actions may relieve the court of last re-
sort of the responsibility of having to address that issue. A court of
last resort can decide only a limited number of cases, and with in-
creasing frequency, because of expanding caseloads, some impor-
69. See Meador, supra note 7, at 473-81.
70. See Remarks by Chief Justice Warren Burger, supra note 60.
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tant issues may be rejected simply because of a lack of space on its
calendar. The en banc proceeding can provide an important forum
for definitive precedential decisions on these types of issues.
The en banc process provides an important forum for an inter-
mediate appellate court to work as a unified collegial body to
achieve the objectives of both finality and uniformity of the law
within the court's jurisdiction. This avoids the perception that the
court consists of separate independent panels speaking with multi-
ple voices with no apparent responsibility to the court as a whole.
Acting in this manner should enhance the credibility of the inter-
mediate appellate courts.
Clearly, if intermediate appellate courts are given the responsi-
bility to be courts of finality in certain areas of the law, they
should be able to resolve their own conflicts and address issues
which they deem important in their jurisdiction. There is nothing
that can discredit the courts and the judicial system more than the
public perception that the courts are inconsistent. If the facts are
the same, the law should be the same, and there is no logical or
reasonable way that a direct conflict between panels of the same
court can be justified. To achieve credibility, our appellate process
must be able to efficiently and expeditiously resolve inconsistent
decisions. As we expand our intermediate appellate courts by ad-
ding more judges, and thereby establishing more three-judge
panels to address this growing caseload, attaining this goal be-
comes even more important. The en banc process, even with its
disadvantages, appears to be a useful tool to resolve conflicts and
help provide doctrinal harmony.
B. Subject Matter Organization Plan
An innovative judicial administration proposal to reduce con-
flicting decisions and improve doctrinal harmony within intermedi-
ate appellate courts is the concept of selective assignment of cases
by subject matter organization to designated court divisions. This
is a new and promising judicial administration proposal advocated
by Professor Daniel Meador.7 1 Although it is untried in this coun-
try, it is fully utilized in West Germany.
71. See Meador, supra note 7, for a general discussion of subject matter organization.
Professor Meador also discussed subject matter organization as implemented by the courts
of West Germany in Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design
from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1981). See also P.
CARRINGTON, supra note 5, at 174-84.
72. See Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design from an
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The procedure provides a means of specialization for the appel-
late judiciary, but avoids almost all the major disadvantages of
court specialization. The procedure is designed to provide more
uniformity of decisions by channeling each category of legal issues
to a limited number of three-judge panels, thereby avoiding the
conflicts that necessarily occur when a substantial and growing
number of three-judge panels decide all categories of cases. Proper
implementation of subject matter organization can result in a bet-
ter informed judiciary which, in turn, can provide continuity in
specifically assigned areas of law.
In West Germany, where there is considerably more access to
the judicial system than in this country, the procedure is necessary
for effective judicial administration. The West Germans are able to
administer huge caseloads with a large number of judges by using
this specialized subject matter assignment plan in all their inter-
mediate appellate courts. West Germany has nineteen intermedi-
ate appellate courts with a total of 1,382 judges. Each court, con-
sisting of from 17 to 149 judges, is divided into divisions of 4 or 5
judges each who sit in panels of 3 to hear the specifically assigned
cases. Although there are specialized assignments of a limited na-
ture to each division, each division has areas of assignment in vari-
ous parts of the law such as contract, tort, commercial, and envi-
ronmental matters. The assignments are narrow on the one hand
but provide a substantial variety of the law on the other hand .7
This proposal challenges the intermediate appellate judiciary of
this nation to examine a totally new approach to the problem of
conflicting decisions caused by an expanding judiciary. Some oppo-
nents may argue that this is the specialization wolf dressed in
sheep's clothing. For very good reasons, the creation of specialized
courts has not been favored for addressing the problems created by
expanding caseloads. Committees and commissions established to
develop plans or proposals to address the growth of the judicial
system have unanimously rejected specialized courts as a proper
solution7 " as has the ABA Standards for Appellate Courts .7 There
are well-supported reasons for this rejection, including (1) special-
American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 27, 44-49 (1981).
73. Id. at 44-47.
74. See, e.g., Report, supra note 36, at 290-91; Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change
28-30 (1975). See also R. LLAR, supra note 12, at 41-42, 70-71.
75. See ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO COURT ORGANIZATION (1974).
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ized judges tend to view cases with a very narrow "tunnel vision"
perspective; (2) a specialized court becomes incestuous between the
bench and the very limited specialized bar that practices before
that court; (3) these specialized courts develop their own procedure
and legal principles unconnected with other segments of the law;
(4) the judiciary, because of its limited area of responsibility, is
more likely to be subject to the influence of the special interests of
the subject matter over which it presides; and (5) a specialized
court's limited jurisdiction by its nature results in a loss of prestige
to this type of court. The reasons against specialization of courts
were best articulated by Simon Rifkin when he wrote:
[A] body of law, secluded from the rest, develops a jargon of its
own, thought-patterns that are unique, internal policies which it
subserves and which are different from and sometimes at odds
with the policies pursued by the general law.
Once you complete the circle of specialization by having a special-
ized court as well as a specialized Bar, then you have set aside a
body of wisdom that is the exclusive possession of a very small
group of men who take their purposes for granted. Very soon
their internal language becomes so highly stylized as to be
unintelligible to the uninitiated. That in turn intensifies the se-
clusiveness of that branch of the law and that further immunizes
it against the refreshment of new ideas, suggestions, adjustments
and compromises which constitute the very tissue of any living
system of law. In time, like a primitive priest-craft, content with
its vested privileges, it ceases to proselytize, to win converts to its
cause, to persuade laymen of the social values that it defends.
Such a development is invariably a cause of decadence and
decay.76
What is most significant about this new subject matter organiza-
tion proposal is that this plan of selected assignment takes advan-
tage of the benefits- of specialized courts while minimizing the neg-
ative effects of specialization identified above.
There are three essential elements of a subject matter organiza-
tion plan.7 First, divisions must be established in each intermedi-
ate appellate court. Each court would be divided into semiperma-
nent administrative divisions of from four to seven judges. For
76. Rifkin, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judici-
ary, 37 A.B.A.J. 425, 425-26 (1951).
77. See Meador, supra note 7, at 475-81.
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example, a fifteen-judge court would be divided into three five-
member divisions. These divisions would have a presiding judge
and would decide cases sitting in panels of three. Judges would
rotate only within the division.
Secondly, each division would be assigned certain specific cate-
gories of cases. For example, division one would receive family law,
condemnation proceedings, and automobile tort cases; division two
would receive general torts, product liability, real property, and
probate cases. Division three would receive administrative law,
malpractice, Uniform Commercial Code, and general equity mat-
ters. It is extremely important that each division be given a variety
of subject matters. A division must not be relegated to deciding
cases in just one single area of the law, such as workers' compensa-
tion. Criminal cases, because of their volume, present a special
problem. In most jurisdictions they comprise forty-five percent of
an intermediate appellate court's caseload. 78 There is a solution.
Each division should be assigned an equal portion of the criminal
law calendar. Even with this equal division of the criminal law
cases, there could be special assignment of categories of criminal
cases to each of the individual divisions. For example, division one
could receive all RICO matters; division two, all speedy trial issues;
and division three, all issues relating to the validity of drug stat-
utes. The plan of case assignments should be reviewed annually, if
not semiannually, to assure an equal division of workload among
the divisions. Further, the specific assignments should be made
public so that the bar and the litigants would have full knowledge
of the division to which their case would be assigned when
appealed.
The third essential element of this plan is the requirement that
administrative divisions should be semipermanent. The divisions
must be permanent enough to assure continuity but, to avoid stag-
nation, there should be a staggered rotation. For example, one
judge in each division could rotate to another division each year.
If the plan is properly implemented, most of the usual problems
of specialization are avoided. With the variety of assignments there
is no tunnel vision and no incestuous relationship between the
bench and a very limited specialized bar. The plan should not
cause these divisions to develop their own procedures or principles
unconnected with other segments of the law. Further, since judges
are available to serve the court as a whole and periodically rotate
78. See National Center, supra note 1, at 2.
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to other divisions, the problems of the influence of special interests
and loss of prestige should not be applicable.
The implementation of this type of assignment plan can enhance
both uniformity and stability of decisions within the jurisdiction of
the intermediate appellate courts because it limits dramatically the
number of different three-judge panels that could address similar
issues.79 This is graphically illustrated by the fact that on a fifteen-
judge court the number of possible three-judge panels is 455, while
the number of possible three-judge panels from a five-man division
would be 10.
Implementation of the plan would require judges of large inter-
mediate appellate courts who are accustomed to rotating panels of
all judges of their court to accept the limited assignment within a
division. Although some personalities may have difficulty adapting,
this system places them in essentially the same collegial posture as
individuals sitting on courts of last resort. The proposal should,
because of the smallness of the division and the regular association
of the judges of the division, improve collegial discussions of the
legal issues before the court for resolution. Equally important, the
judges should, in a relatively short period of time, be familiar with
the current state of the law in the specific areas assigned to their
division and, consequently, should be able to work more expedi-
tiously and effectively.
Finally, if properly implemented, there is no reason why a modi-
fied en banc process as discussed in the prior section could not be
utilized to allow the administrative divisions within each court to
sit en banc to resolve conflicts in addition to deciding cases of im-
portance in their area of the law. This proposal effectively ad-
dresses the problems of conflicts and inconsistencies brought about
by the large number of appellate decisions decided by an increas-
ing number of different judicial panels. It particularly warrants se-
rious consideration for use by intermediate appellate courts of
fifteen or more judges.
C. Certified Questions as Part of the Screening Mechanism for
Courts of Last Resort
The certified question process is a relatively new judicial admin-
istrative technique that can be of major assistance to courts of last
resort in carrying out their case-screening function. 80 When prop-
79. See Meador, supra note 7, at 475-81.
80. Florida is the only jurisdiction fully utilizing this authority, although the federal cir-
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erly utilized it can save substantial judicial time and reduce reli-
ance on staff recommendations.
A major function of every court of last resort is to determine
which cases it should hear on the merits. The maximum number of
cases these courts are able to hear and decide with published opin-
ions is approximately 350 cases.81 As indicated previously, the ap-
pellate caseload explosion has caused a substantial volume increase
in the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts, and it is not
possible to have a proportionate corresponding increase in the
number of decisions on the merits by state courts of last resort.
As the intermediate appellate courts' caseloads expand, the ap-
plications for review by courts of last resort increase and the
screening function of those courts consumes an increasing percent-
age of these judges' time. This is time that formerly was used to
deliberate, determine, and author cases on the merits. The primary
method utilized to recapture this time and reduce the amount of
judicial labor expended on the screening function is to delegate re-
sponsibility for screening to staff. A number of courts depend upon
a central staff to assist the court in this responsibility. 2 In these
circumstances, central staff attorneys screen petitions for review
when they are initially filed in the appellate court and prepare rec-
ommendations as to whether a case should be considered on the
merits and, if so, whether to grant or deny oral argument. These
central staff attorneys are responsible to the court as a whole
rather than to an individual judge. A law clerk may, of course, be
used in the same manner.83 Justice John Paul Stevens generated
considerable public interest in the delegation of this screening
function when he explained in a speech to the American Judica-
ture Society that he must depend almost exclusively on his law
clerks to screen petitions for certiorari filed with the United States
Supreme Court. Justice Stevens stated:
cuit courts of appeals also have this authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1982).
81. This is extending considerably the optimum number of opinions a judge should write
since authorities recommend that a judge should not be required to write more than 25
opinions a year. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 5, at 145. For a seven-member court, this
requires each court member to author 55 opinions, with the chief justice writing a reduced
load of 20 opinions a year.
82. See P. CARRINOTON, supra note 5, at 44-45; Bird, The Hidden Judiciary, 6 JUDGES' J.
4 (1977); Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 465 (1975); McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777
(1981).
83. See Cameron, supra note 82, at 468-69.
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I have found it necessary to delegate a great deal of responsibility
in the review of certiorari petitions to my law clerks. They ex-
amine them all and select a small minority that they believe I
should read myself. As a result, I do not even look at the papers
in over eighty percent of the cases that are filed.""
When it is recognized that there are over 4,500 petitions for review
filed annually in the United States Supreme Court, it must be ac-
cepted that it would be humanly impossible for one man to person-
ally review each petition and carry on his other responsibilities on
the court.
The use of central staff attorneys or law clerks to make these
types of decisions has been criticized as placing substantial power
in young and inexperienced lawyer personnel who have no true ac-
countability to the public. The view has been expressed that the
central staff is a "cancerous growth" that must be controlled. 85 The
chief justice of California has expressed concern about the need to
delegate this responsibility to staff whom she describes as the
"hidden judiciary" or "shadow court."' It should be noted that
the California Supreme Court, which has a caseload of over four
thousand cases,8 7 presently utilizes a central staff of eleven law-
yers, and each justice on that court has four lawyer research
aides."
Florida decided to address the problem of the substantial in-
crease in the screening responsibilities of its state supreme court in
a different manner.8 ' It recognized that the supreme court could
not realistically provide discretionary review to a significant por-
tion of the more than thirteen thousand cases filed in the Florida
intermediate appellate courts in addition to providing a mandatory
review in certain categories of cases. Florida determined it wanted
to avoid any substantial delegation of this screening function to
staff and, in a reform of its supreme court's jurisdiction, limited
supreme court review of intermediate appellate court decisions on
the one hand but, ih exchange, substantially broadened the author-
ity of the intermediate appellate court to identify and certify im-
84. Stevens, Some thoughts on judicial restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 179 (1982).
85. See McCree, supra note 82, at 787.
86. See Bird, supra note 82, at 4-5.
87. See Appendix A.
88. This information was derived from a questionnaire sent to the chief justices of the
ten most populous states.
89. For a full explanation of this new constitutional scheme, see England, Hunter & Wil-
liams, supra note 17; Overton, supra note 17.
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portant issues to the supreme court for its resolution. The hope
was that, under this new constitutional scheme, part of the screen-
ing responsibility would be exercised by the intermediate courts of
appeal under the broadened certification authority. This process
has been relatively successful. In 1982, over one-half of the deci-
sions of the district courts of appeal of Florida which were ac-
cepted by the supreme court for review came to the supreme court
through the certified question process.9" In fact, all questions certi-
fied by the district courts were accepted. The process has also
proved to be an excellent means of having the supreme court re-
view state court policy decisions that may have become obsolete.91
Under Florida's certification process, the intermediate appellate
courts may certify three types of matters to the supreme court: (1)
a question of great public importance; (2) a decision which is in
direct conflict with the decision of another district court of appeal;
and (3) a judgment of a trial court pending before a district court
of appeal that is of great public importance or that has a great
effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state
and thereby requires immediate resolution by the supreme court.
The first two categories require the district court to render a deci-
sion on the merits, while the latter, referred to as the "pass-
through" provision, provides a method for direct supreme court
consideration without a district court decision. 2
The majority of cases certified have been certified as being of
great public importance. The term "great public importance,"
rather than "great public interest," was used in order to allow
judges to make a determination that it is an important issue that
requires supreme court resolution. It was previously argued that
"public interest" required the public to actually know of and be
interested in the matter in order for it to be certified. The present
phraseology was intended to allow Florida's intermediate appellate
courts to certify any question which they believed presented a sig-
90. See Overton, supra note 17, at 84-86. See also the comparison chart in Appendix C.
91. Some subjects which have been certified to the Florida Supreme Court for reconsid-
eration are interspousal immunity and family immunity. See, e.g., Dressier v. Tubbs, 435 So.
2d 792 (Fla. 1983); Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.
1982); Roberts v. Roberts, 414 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1982); West v. West, 414 So. 2d 189 (Fla.
1982).
92. The provision of the Florida Constitution providing for district court certification is
contained in art. V, § 3(b)(4). This provision reads as follows: "May review any decision of a
district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great public
importance, or that is certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another dis-
trict court of appeal."
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nificant jurisprudential issue.93
The second type of certified question allows Florida's district
courts of appeal to put the supreme court on notice that a district
court decision conflicts with a decision of another district court or
with a decision of the supreme court on the same question of law.
This allows the intermediate appellate courts of Florida to directly
suggest a resolution of the conflict when they disagree with a sister
court on a principle of law which they understand applies to a sim-
ilar set of facts.
The third type of certification method operates through a "pass-
through" provision that provides a means for the supreme court to
expeditiously consider cases that need immediate resolution
without first having the cases proceed to a decision by the interme-
diate court of appeal. This pass-through provision is intended to
be used sparingly; it has been effectively used by the intermediate
courts in Florida to certify a few important issues.9' One 1982 case
concerned the removal of a constitutional amendment from the
1982 general election ballot because of misleading language. 5 The
entire process, from the filing of the complaint through the circuit
court trial and the rendering of a supreme court written opinion
after oral argument, took a total of thirty-six days. In 1983, the
"pass-through" provision was used to determine the constitutional-
ity of a state excise tax on liquor sales. The trial court had de-
clared the tax unconstitutional and stayed the collection and de-
posit of the funds. At the time, the state had over $1,250,000 in
collected funds which could not be deposited. The intermediate
appellate court certified the case to the supreme court for immedi-
ate resolution. The issue was resolved within 117 days. 6
The total certified question process provides a means by which a
court of last resort can identify issues which the judiciary of the
intermediate appellate courts believe are important for the court of
93. See Overton, supra note 17, at 86 & n.41.
94. "Pass-through" certification is permitted by FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5). This pro-
vision reads as follows:
May review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the district court of
appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public importance, or to have
a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state, and
certified to require immediate resolution by the supreme court.
For a more complete explanation of this provision, see Overton, supra note 17, at 86-88.
95. Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982).
96. See Rutledge v. Chandler, 445 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1983). Plaintiffs filed the initial
complaint in the circuit court on August 12, 1983. The Florida Supreme Court rendered a
summary opinion on December 6, 1983. A full opinion explaining the court's rationale was
rendered on February 16, 1984.
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last resort to resolve. The process is not intended, however, to be
the exclusive means to determine which cases should be considered
for review nor is it intended to make review of such questions by
the court of last resort mandatory. Most importantly, this process
allows three appellate judicial officers, who are familiar with the
case, as well as other matters within their court, to make a recom-
mendation of what they believe is an important issue for resolution
by the state's highest court. In effect, instead of the supreme court
having to depend on the recommendation of a central staff, or an
individual staff member who may be young and inexperienced, the
court has the opportunity to receive the advice and recommenda-
tions of experienced judges who are familiar with the record in the
case.
Florida is the only jurisdiction to fully utilize this certification
process. The federal courts have the authority to certify questions
to the United States Supreme Court but have rarely done so.9"
Florida, on the other hand, has a long history of using certified
questions to identify issues that need resolution by its state su-
preme court. In addition, for over thirty years it has provided a
means for the federal appellate courts to certify questions of Flor-
ida law to the Supreme Court of Florida for resolution.98 Prior to
97. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1982), cases in the courts of appeals may be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court
[b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any
civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certifica-
tion the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record
to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
United States Supreme Court Rules 24 and 25 deal with the court's jurisdiction of certified
questions. This certification procedure is rarely used. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. United States,
353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957).
98. Florida has had a statute authorizing the state supreme court to receive and answer
certified questions of state law from federal appellate courts since 1945. FLA. STAT. § 25.031
(1945). This statute was the first of its kind in the United States. The provision was not
used until 1960 when the United States Supreme Court remanded a case to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals with the suggestion that the court certify controlling questions of Florida
law to the Florida Supreme Court. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960). The
Fifth Circuit responded by certifying two nonconstitutional questions to the Florida Su-
preme Court. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 377 U.S. 179 (1964). Prior to the certification of these questions, the Florida Su-
preme Court adopted a rule of court procedure to implement the statute. In re Florida
Appellate Rules, 127 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1961). The court construed § 25.031 and Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 4.61 (current version FLA. R. App. P. 9.150) and upheld their
constitutionality.
In 1980 the state adopted a constitutional amendment which provided for the express
constitutional authority for the supreme court to consider questions of state law certified by
federal appellate courts. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6). England & Williams, supra note 17.
The language of this provision is the same as that which governed certification under the
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1980, a limited means for intermediate appellate courts to certify
questions of great public interest was available but had limited
utilization.9
The utilization of the recommendations of lower court judges to
determine what cases should be heard by a higher court has a his-
torical foundation. Our heritage reflects that English appellate pro-
cedure provides a judicial screening process whereby a single lower
court judge determines the cases in which leave to appeal should
be granted and heard by the court of appeals in England.'00
The Florida experience demonstrates that judicial participation
by intermediate appellate courts through the use of the certified
question process can be of major assistance in the screening func-
tion of courts of last resort and can reduce the reliance on central
or individual staff to make important screening decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The en banc rule, the subject matter organization plan, and the
utilization of certified questions are each administrative techniques
that, if fully implemented, can help provide a prescriptive remedy
for the appellate caseload explosion. It must be recognized that the
increase in appellate caseload has caused a substantial loss of cred-
ibility of the courts as institutions because of inconsistency and
lack of finality in our court structure. Courts which decline to con-
sider conflicting decisions or utilize a depublication process of erro-
neous decisions because they do not have sufficient time to resolve
these cases on the merits provide a justifiable basis for criticism of
statute and procedural rule.
Florida's certification procedure enables the federal courts to ascertain an undecided
question of state law. The question of state law is decided by the state's highest appellate
court, thus avoiding the possibility of a redetermination of facts by a state trial court. Use of
certification permits the federal courts to avoid both unnecessary determinations of federal
issues where state law may control and federal determinations of state law, much like the
application of the abstention doctrine.
Since its inception, the Florida certification procedure has been used by both the United
States Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts. The clerk of the Florida Supreme
Court has estimated that federal courts will continue to certify approximately five cases per
year to the Florida Supreme Court. The court may restate the question certified and may
consider and address any issues it perceives to be involved. See Coastal Petroleum Co. v.
Secretary of the Army of the United States, 489 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1973).
99. In 1979, only 23 cases were certified to the Florida Supreme Court as being of great
public interest. In 1981, 86 cases were certified to the supreme court under the new constitu-
tional provision. This new provision provides for certified questions of great public impor-
tance, certified conflict, and certified judgments of trial courts. See Appendix C.
100. See, e.g., Meador, English Appellate Judges from an American Perspective, 66
GEO. L.J. 1349, 1363-64, 1367 (1978).
APPELLATE CASELOAD
an appellate structure that requires these actions. 10' Because of
fast changing technology in multiple fields, our courts, even with-
out expanding caseloads, would have difficulty addressing these
new issues in a timely manner. We need to use every available tool
to assure that the court system operates in an expeditious and de-
finitive manner in this changing era.
More than anything else it must be realized that people, not just
rules and procedures, make the system work. Major judicial expan-
sion, with an increased number of judges, has adversely affected
the collegiality of our appellate courts. The expansion of judicial
manpower has strained the ability, particularly of large intermedi-
ate appellate courts, to be truly collegial bodies with desired judge
interaction. A judge of an intermediate appellate court has written
that every member of an appellate court must realize that all
members come to that body with "differing biases, values, and phi-
losophies, but they share the common discipline of the law and a
single fidelity-to their court and their joint product, the law it
makes."102 The view that one three-judge panel should be indepen-
dent of other panels on the same court is contrary to the obligation
of all judges on one court to work as a collegial body for the benefit
of the whole court.
It is essential that the intermediate appellate court judges have
an engrained fidelity to their court as an institution-not just to
the members of the panel on which they sit-because their work
product is law for the court as a whole. In this present era, the
intermediate appellate court is the court that is addressing most of
the appellate issues of our times. Collegiality of a court is the es-
sential glue that provides a cohesive court structure, and any pro-
posed administrative reforms can be truly effective only if they en-
hance both the collegiality and the administrative efficiency of the
court. The en banc process and the subject organization plan pro-
vide intermediate appellate courts with better means to assure
consistency of their decisions and a greater opportunity to have a
collegial discussion on important legal issues. The ability to certify
questions provides a means for independent judicial officers, rather
than staff, to identify important issues for resolution in courts of
last resort, and, consequently, can reduce reliance on a burgeoning
judicial bureaucracy. If properly implemented, these suggested ad-
101. Gerstein, "Law by elimination": depublication in the California Supreme Court,
67 JUDICATURE 292 (1984).
102. F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE APPELLATE BENCH 171
(1980).
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APPENDIX A: APPELLATE STRUCTURE STATISTICS:
HIGHEST APPELLATE COURTS OF THE
TOP TEN STATES (1982)
Appendix A is a comparison of the highest appellate courts of
the ten most populous states. This chart was prepared from infor-
mation received in response to a questionnaire sent to the chief
justices of the ten most populous states and from information ob-
tained from West Publishing Company. It also contains a compari-
son with the caseload of the United States Supreme Court.
APPENDIX B: APPELLATE COURT STATISTICS: INTER-
MEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS OF THE
TOP TEN STATES (1982)
Appendix B is a comparison of the intermediate appellate courts
of the ten most populous states. It was prepared from information
received in response to a questionnaire sent to the chief justices of
the ten most populous states and from information obtained from
West Publishing Company.
APPENDIX C: FLORIDA APPELLATE STRUCTURE
STATISTICS
Appendix C is a statistical analysis of cases filed in the Supreme
Court of Florida for the year 1979, the last full year under the
prior constitutional provision, compared with the year 1981, the
first full year under the new constitutional provision. It was pre-
pared by a staff assistant's examination of the records of all cases
filed in .1979 and in 1981 and following those cases to their respec-
tive conclusions.
This chart establishes that the Supreme Court of Florida de-
cided more cases on the merits on the basis of conflict under the
new constitutional amendment than it did under the prior consti-
tutional provision. The total number of cases decided by the su-
preme court in 1979 on pure conflict, without regard to certified
questions, was 50, compared to 83 cases decided in 1981, the first
full year under the new constitutional provision. The supreme
court also considered more certified questions under the new
amendment than it did under the old provision. In 1981, the court
accepted 86 cases, compared to 23 in 1979.
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